

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 030016
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AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY
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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 030016
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 STATE 030016

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBM'S: FEBRUARY 10 POLADS DISCUSSION

REF: USNATO 386 DTG 241638Z JAN 77

1. THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES GUIDANCE FOR USE IN POLADS
DISCUSSION OF CBM'S, FEBRUARY 10.

2. THE BRITISH AND NORWEGIAN PAPERS AND THE JANUARY 21
DISCUSSION OF NORWEGIAN PAPER IN POLADS HAVE BEEN USEFUL IN
CLARIFYING VIEWS ON POSSIBLE ALLIED CBM'S INITIATIVES FOR
BELGRADE.

3. AS WE HAVE STATED EARLIER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE NEW ALLIED
INITIATIVES AT BELGRADE SHOULD BE SO NUMEROUS AS TO
DETRACT FROM THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF THE MEETING ON REVIEW
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. WE ALSO WISH TO
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE FINAL ACT AND TO AVOID
GIVING THE SOVIETS GROUNDS FOR SEEKING TO REOPEN OTHER
OF ITS PROVISIONS (E.G., IN BASKET III).

4. HOWEVER, THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL ACT DOES SPECIFI-
CALLY ENVISAGE THE POSSIBILITY OF "DEVELOPING AND EN-
LARGING MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE," BASED

UPON EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT CBM'S.
FURTHERMORE, THE WEST'S RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITSOME
OF THE MORE VOLUNTARY CBM'S OFFERS IMPLEMENTATION PRE-
CEDENTS ON WHICH TO BASE A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS.

5. THE US VALUES CBM'S AS A MEANS OF HABITUATING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 030016

SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES TO GREATER
OPENNESS ABOUT THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITY AND HENCE OF
INCREASING CONFIDENCE AND REDUCING TENSIONS IN EUROPE.
THE CBM'S AGREED TO AT HELSINKI WERE A USEFUL BEGINNING.
WE SEE ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST IN BUILDING MODESTLY UPON
THE FINAL ACT IN A WAY WHICH COULD BRING WITHIN A FRAME-
WORK OF NOTIFICATIONS AND OPENNESS TO OBSERVATION A LARGER
PORTION OF THE PACT'S MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE POTENTIAL
CONTRIBUTION OF CBM'S TO WARNING TIME, SLIGHT TO DATE,
COULD ALSO INCREASE IT'S STRENGTHENING OF THE CBM REGIME.
WE BELIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE PURSUED AT BELGRADE
IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH NATO'S OVERALL OBJECTIVES
AND TACTICAL AIMS IN CSCE (REFTEL).

6. THUS WE BELIEVE ALLIES SHOULD DEVELOP A LIMITED
NUMBER OF NEW CBM PROPOSALS FOR PRESENTATION IN BELGRADE.
WE WOULD ENVISAGE THESE PROPOSALS AS SUBJECTS FOR TREAT-
MENT BY THE BELGRADE MEETING ITSELF RATHER THAN BY A
POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS GROUP ON MILITARY SUBJECTS. WE

BELIEVE THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A GROUP WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY CONTRARY TO ALLIED INTERESTS SINCE IT COULD DEVELOP INTO AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MBFR FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY RIVAL NATO AS A COORDINATION POINT FOR WESTERN POSITIONS ON MILITARY ISSUES. ITS EXISTENCE WOULD OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD BE HIGHLY DIVISIVE FOR THE WEST, AND WE ARE THEREFORE OPPOSED TO INITIATIVES WHICH WILL LEAD TO CREATION OF SUCH A GROUP.

7. WE HOPE ALLIES WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORT TO IDENTIFY THE MOST USEFUL AND WORKABLE INITIATIVES FOR PRESENTATION IN BELGRADE. WE AGREE WITH THE BRITISH THAT DISCUSSION AT THE PRESENT STAGE SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO IDENTIFYING AND REFINING PROPOSALS OF SUBSTANTIVE BENEFIT FOR POSSIBLE WESTERN SPONSORSHIP. DECISIONS ABOUT WHICH OF THESE ULTIMATELY TO PUT FORWARD WILL HAVE TO BE MADE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 030016

CLOSER TO THE OPENING OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING.

8. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR ALLIED CBM'S INITIATIVES IN NORWEGIAN PAPER:

A. LOWERING OF THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS OR STRENGTHENING THE TEXT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER-SCALE MANEUVERS: WE BELIEVE THESE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THE SAME PROBLEM: HOW TO BRING ABOUT SOVIET AND WP NOTIFICATIONS OF MANEUVERS SMALLER THAN THE 25,000-TROOP THRESHOLD FOR MAJOR MANEUVERS. WE RECOGNIZE BROAD INTEREST AMONG THE ALLIES IN TAKING AN INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA AND SEE SOME ADVANTAGES IN A MEASURE WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT NOTIFICATION OF A GREATER AMOUNT OF PACT MANEUVER ACTIVITY AND HELP CONFIRM THE PATTERN OF THIS ACTIVITY. FURTHERMORE, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION NATO HOLDS MORE MANEUVERS REQUIRING NOTIFICATION THAN DOES THE PACT. HOWEVER:

-- WE WISH TO MAINTAIN EMPHASIS AT BELGRADE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS ALREADY AGREED IN THE FINAL ACT.

-- WE WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD REOPEN FOR NEGOTIATION THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

-- WE WISH TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WILL ATTRACT ROAD ALLIED AND WESTERN SUPPORT.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO RESIST
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE THRESHOLD (AND IN OTHER CBM
PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT).

OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES MENTIONED IN THE
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 030016

NORWEGIAN PAPER, LOWERING THE THRESHOLD FOR MAJOR MANEUVERS
WOULD BE THE MOST BINDING BUT ALSO MOST EASILY REPRESENTED
BY THE PACT AS A MODIFICATION OF THE FINAL ACT. AN
AGREED STATEMENT DEFINING WHAT IS MEANT BY SMALLER SCALE
MANEUVERS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE DUTCH PROPOSAL, WOULD
BE LESS VULNERABLE IN THIS RESPECT BUT WOULD ALSO BE LESS
BINDING. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE AN AGREED STATEMENT
WHICH WOULD BOTH DEFINE SMALLER-SCALE MANEUVERS AND
STRENGTHEN THE OBLIGATION TO REPORT THEM (FOR EXAMPLE, BY
STATING THAT NOTIFICATION OF SUCH MANEUVERS "SHALL" BE
GIVEN). TO RELATE TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL ACT
CONCERNING DEVELOPING AND ENLARGING CBM'S, BASED ON EX-
PERIENCE WITH THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, SUCH A STATEMENT
MIGHT NOTE THAT THE NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALLER-SCALE
MANEUVERS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN SINCE HELSINKI HAVE CON-
TRIBUTED TO STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND INCREASING
SECURITY AND STABILITY. ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM OF BRINGING ABOUT SOVIET AND WP NOTIFICATION OF
SMALLER MANEUVERS WOULD BE TO PRESS IN BELGRADE FOR FULL

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING CBM ON SMALLER MANEUVERS,
USING WESTERN PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA AS AN EXAMPLE,
AND WITHOUT MAKING A FORMAL NEW PROPOSAL AT ALL.

WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER
THESE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES TOGETHER, AS POSSIBLE AL-
TERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THE SAME PROBLEM.

WE AGREE WITH GERMANS THAT SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BORDER
AREAS, AS SUGGESTED IN NORWEGIAN PAPER'S DISCUSSION OF
STRENGTHENING OF CBM'S ON NOTIFICATION OF OTHER
MANEUVERS, WOULD BUTTRESS GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTIVE
VIEW OF COM'S ADVANCED BY SOVIETS AND WOULD THEREFORE BE
UNDESIRABLE.

B. MORE CLOSELY DEFINED CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION: WE
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PAGE 06 STATE 030016

AGREE WITH THOSE ALLIES WHO HAVE INDICATED THAT THE CONTENT

OF NOTIFICATION AS PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED IS SATISFACTORY FOR THE GENERAL POLITICAL PURPOSE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AS IT HAS BEEN CONCEIVED IN NATO UP TO NOW. AT THE SAME TIME, INCLUSION IN NOTIFICATIONS OF INFORMATION ON UNITS ABOVE A GIVEN SIZE INVOLVED IN A MANEUVER WOULD ENHANCE ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND TO JUDGE WHETHER SCOPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGITIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANNOUNCED MANEUVER. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN OTHER ALLIED VIEWS ON THE PROS AND CONS OF A MEASURE STRENGTHENING THE OBLIGATION TO REPORT SUCH INFORMATION.

C. REINFORCING THE TEXT OF EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS: WE AGREE WITH DUTCH, ITALIAN AND FRG VIEWS EXPRESSED DURING JANUARY 21 POLADS MEETING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OBLIGATION TO INVITE OBSERVERS AND CONCUR THAT ANY INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA SHOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY UPON STANDARDS FOR THEIR TREATMENT, FOR WHICH SWEDEN EVIDENTLY INTENDS TO ADVANCE A DRAFT "CODE". WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT INCREASE IN EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS WOULD BENEFIT THE ALLIES; WE WISH TO ENCOURAGE THIS, AS LONG AS DECISION TO INVITE AND MODALITIES OF INVITATION REMAIN DISCRETIONARY.

9. WE AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A CBM'S PAPER TO WORK FROM, AND YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE IS TO PREPARE A DRAFT.

10. FOR PARIS: GIVEN PARTICULARLY CONSERVATIVE VIEWS OF FRENCH ON CBM'S, WE WOULD APPRECIATE IN-HOUSE EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR FRENCH FLEXIBILITY IN CURRENT

POLADS DISCUSSIONS OF CBM'S FOR BELGRADE.
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